

PECO 5501F, PSCI 5501F, SOCI 5504F

OTHER WORLDS OTHER GLOBALISATIONS

RESEARCH ESSAY

***FROM HEGEMONY TO SECURITY AND BACK TO HEGEMONY IN A
GLOBAL WORLD. CANADA AND THE ILLUSION OF MULTICULTURALISM***

Submitted by: Mihaela Vieru
To: Instructor Jai Sen

- December, 2006 -

Transnational movement of people is by no means a new phenomenon on the global stage. What we nowadays call 'globalisation' and perceive as a manifestation of a 'new' era in the post-modern world may be considered, under a different lens, as old as the world itself (or worlds for that matter). People have always travelled – under one form or another and for different reasons – and with them products have been exchanged. Why is it then that globalisation gets so intensively mediatised as marking a 'new' mechanism that structures the canvas of transnational relations? Is it not because – somehow paradoxically and contradicting the very principles of this social-political and cultural 'movement' – the state borders are more than ever relevant in how (im)migrants are perceived and in setting up categories of social relations that govern the way they are received, incorporated, and accommodated within certain geographic spaces? I am not talking here exclusively about physical borders or spaces, but also about cultural borders (symbolic in their representation, but very functional in their practice) erected by hegemonies that have long established their preferences in terms of what is to be 'valued' and 'devalued', or what is to be 'accepted' as civilised and 'rejected' as not civilised.

In other words, globalisation has become the umbrella that legitimises host states to adopt the 'best way' to deal with (im)migrants, depending on their interpretation of the 'global' dynamics in demographics, economics, and more recently 'security' climate (or any combination of these; it is my firm belief though that these dimensions cannot be separated and they permanently condition each other). This 'best way' though, under the same globalisation principles, has to be 'harmonised' with what seems to be the 'common good', which – in the process of being exercised – is rendered more 'common' for some than for the 'others'. The 9/11 events are a perfect example of how 'common good' was internationally risen to the status of unquestionable belief, aimed at validating

the almost organic now connection between the ‘security’ of the physical borders and the ‘security’ of the nation(s). I would argue that this is not primarily concern with physical security – as we are most likely led to believe – but rather concern with cultural ‘security’ (see the above mention related to physical and cultural borders and spaces). In this line of reasoning, ‘security’ has been shaped to replace the more politically loaded and contested concept of ‘hegemony’. The tragic events have been transformed into a sort of legitimisation to pursue harmonised ‘national safety’ at any costs. ‘Harmonised national measures’ in the name of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ actually translates into articulating cultural hegemony in a new form: the globalised form.

Starting from the above-outlined framework of ideas, this paper proposes to make the link between globalisation, international migration, ‘national safety’, human individual/collective/national rights, race/ethnicity, migrants’ loyalty to their new countries, and the manner in which they should be incorporated into the host-societies. In doing so, I will document the way the ‘new’ international social climate, as determined by the 9/11 events, has only brought about a reiteration of the cultural hegemonies already set in place for a long time in Canada, but masqued by the multicultural approach to social integration. This view is shared by Banerji when she states that the multicultural ideology is only “paving the war between the English and the French”, that through multiculturalism the ‘others’ have become a tool in the rivalry of the hegemonies (Banerji, 2000:109).

In this context, I am arguing that 9/11 has not had the effect so much of changing Canada’s approach to social integration (i.e. ‘reciprocal integration’), rather that assimilationist and conforming trends and patterns already in practice have been reinforced. In this global ‘anti-terrorist’ exercise, the ‘security’ measures actually constituted into the instrument for the national hegemonic *cultural* ‘security’ to be reinvested, which tends to validate a slight distancing from the multicultural

discourse, the way it has been theoretically constructed. There have been organised numerous meetings and policy workshops where international panel experts from old and new socially pluralistic societies reconsidered multiculturalism and integration on the global stage. They posed the question whether these interdependent social policies and phenomena, the way they are commonly understood in Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, need to be re-thought and adapted to the 'new' international social climate, as a means to prevent further possible events like 9/11 (Metropolis, 2005).

My point in this paper though is that the 9/11 events have only provided the circumstances for a more explicit reiteration of the power rapports between those that have appropriated the identity of 'mainstream'/'majority' and those assigned the collective identity of 'others'/'minority'. At the same time, I am arguing that we are witnessing a new discursive terrain (i.e. the 'security' race), which aims at both paving and legitimising the inherent structural power relations manifested during the social interactions that stand at the basis of transnational migration phenomenon and the integration process. I will focus on Canada's strategy for immigrants' social integration, analysing how committed to the 'reciprocal integration' this country has been in real terms while under the cover of Multiculturalism.

Within this context, some of the key issues addressed will include a documentation of the relationship between globalisation and the 'birth' of the concept 'reciprocal integration', an analysis of Multiculturalism as a social policy theoretically aimed at enhancing immigrants' integration in Canada, and a review of the legislative measures after 9/11 that changed the social perception on the benefits of globalisation and legitimised the transition in viewing the immigrants from 'contributors' in Canadian society to potential 'terrorist threats' (PCERII, 2004). How 'new' or old is this view and is it not just a replacement – validated under the discourse of 'security' – of what

once was the race-based categories of ‘preferable’ and ‘non-preferable’ immigrants? I am arguing that this feeds mainstream attitudes of dissatisfaction with (if not rejection of) immigration or ‘visible’ minorities. In this line, there will also be a display of the public attitudes towards immigrants evaluated through public polls, so as to support the general framing of the essay thesis against the background of power relations that have always governed immigrants’ integration and put pressure on their adaptation behaviour into conforming practices, even within the context of a state policy like Multiculturalism. When analysed within the broader context of globalisation – as just the post-modern form of colonialism – Multiculturalism will be understood not as a frame to enhance ‘reciprocal integration’, but as just another strategy to construct and brand Canada’s ‘mosaic’ national identity. Moreover, while this serves to cement its international position and to attract thus immigrants (who become instrumentalised in a highly politicised discourse on ‘unity in diversity’), it simultaneously reinforces colonial, gendered, classed, and ethnicised hierarchies of power.

Beside the immediate consequences of the attacks in the United States that catalysed public fear and bias extremes against Middle-Eastern looking citizens, the long- run effects of 9/11 are best seen at the discursive level. If before these events, the statal configurations were considered permeable limits and the borders discourse was mainly linked to economic management, since September 2001 there has been manifested an increasing concern on the borders as fixed geographical boundaries within which everything has to be done for the protection against external ‘threats’. Globalisation, previously advocated as the means for both economic prosperity and the spread of democratic ideas, is now seen to also contain, not least through its international migration component, significant dangers to national ‘safety’. As previously mentioned, it is my belief that this

national 'safety' fundamentally addresses not the physical 'security', but the cultural 'security', the systems of representational domination posed under threat by too developed a phenomenon of transnational movement.

Greater scrutiny of the (im)migration phenomenon, with an emphasis on who is entering the country and who is leaving it, has been installed at a global level. The apparent purpose is to ensure that im(migrants) are not potential 'threats' to national security and that they hold an allegiance to 'national' interests. The essentialised reasoning makes that it is especially the immigrants originated in Muslim countries that are scrutinised and believed to be prone to 'attack' these 'national interests'. This is reflective of how within an era of globalization religion has been transformed into political culture and has stopped bringing any contribution to 'civility'; it has rather become a mere tool in constructing 'incivlty' and 'uncivlty', and has served the purpose to reinforce systems of power and collective practices of social exclusion.

In a globalised world, that is supposed to foster exchanges and mixtures of people and ideas, belongings and 'loyalties', religion is no longer just a symbolic attribute or identity marker carried by those who are not similar to the mainstream and yet 'dared' enter the 'privileged' space of 'civilization'; it has gradually become a social fact and a stigma through the implications in the sphere of the social and economic life in Canada and worldwide. An aggressive backlash against immigrants, especially those originated in Muslim countries has manifested all around the world. The case of Maher Arar is a perfect example of how 'religion' has become an important tool in the negotiations of being Canadian; it constitutes into a proof for whom Canada will protect as its own and translates into a reflection of the social hierarchies created by the 'colonising' construction and political interpretation of 'religion', in spite of the Multicultural policy that advocates the retaining of the ethno-cultural and religious identities. While globalization is all about dismissing borders and

benefiting from the spread of cultures and ideas, 'religion' has been paradoxically used in this process to erect symbolic barriers to the culturally and physically bounded space of 'civilization'. Muslim religion does no longer carry culture, but the threat to 'culture', it does no longer contribute to building 'civility', but is seen as destructing it.

The consequence of this 'artful' twist given to globalization through 'religion' is the hate and bias incidents targeting Arabs all over the world (not to mention the military violence in the Middle East, where the 'civilising' army forces of the agents of 'common good' are inflicting harm and destruction in pretty much the same manner that the colonizing forces did centuries ago to the indigenous 'savages' in North America). This, in turn, has offered a motivation to challenge the idea of 'reciprocal integration' in pluralistic societies and apparently led to a change in the perception of how 'integration', as a social policy, should be approached. It is worth highlighting the whole process of how people came in the first place to adopt the negative attitudes, how their behaviour was constructed through intensive 'defensive' mediatisation and discourse, just to later legitimise the policy questions and the 'security' measures installed. That the mainstream attitudes have never been 'accepting', but rather 'tolerating', towards those designated as 'others' is one key aspect that exposes the politics of difference thorough Multiculturalism (this will be expanded on later).

The concept of social **integration as a two-way process**, characterized by a gradual adjustment of (im)migrants – seen not so much in their individual dimension, but rather as ethnic communities, with particular ethnic institutions aimed at helping them in the transition to a new society – on the one hand and of the host-society and its own national institutions on the other hand has come into being in the context of globalisation.

Globalization phenomenon implies social, economic, and political changes in the form of

transnational movements and feedbacks, which bring about the *enlargement of societies* (“*elargissement de la societe*” – Albert Bastenier, *Integration des immigrés ou réintégration dans la societe?*, in Resch, 2001: 64). When talking about society enlargement, Bastenier (in Resch, 2001, p. 64) argues that it is a demographic phenomenon that finally changes population structure, both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a consequence, the members of a society grow in number, as well as in diversity. This constant phenomenon has led to a different perception of the *territorial attachment* and to a kind of ‘mass cosmopolitanism’, which made the modern world **multicultural** in nature. Thus, societies are not to be approached exclusively in instrumental terms, but also from a cultural point of view (Resch, 2001: 69).

As a conclusion, society enlargement is seen as the transformation of the existing social relations, as a redefinition of the traditional cultural and social rapports. The host societies have to adjust to such changes so as to allow the newcomers to negotiate their roles and their identities within the context (Albert Bastenier, *Integration des immigrés ou réintégration dans la societe?*, in Resch, 2001: 70). From this perspective, integration has become a concern for both the newcomers and the host society in itself. For the immigrant, integration is linked to his/her capacity to choose from a plurality of values, norms, practices, which may well be in contradiction with each other or with his/her own ones. For the host society, the problem comes with the necessity to keep the *social functional cohesion*. In this line of reasoning, it can be argued that globalization has reshaped the social frameworks and changed the meaning of integration. Integration now tends to be considered as the process of **reciprocal adaptation** on the part of both the immigrants and the host-societies, which become ethno-culturally diverse.

While this view appears to make sense from a theoretical point of view, the practical terms are highly complicated by the way social identities are perceived by both the immigrants and

the population of the host societies. It is these social perceptions of identity that many praisers of the two-way integration process promoted in Canada through Multiculturalism neglect when stating that “it encourages immigrants to adapt to Canadian society without requiring them to abandon their cultures”, while equally encouraging “people and institutions to respond in kind by respecting and reflecting the cultural differences newcomers bring to the country” (Dorais, 2002:4). There are thus created – it is argued – the environment for people “to participate in several dimensions of societal life and have equitable opportunities to do so” (Dorais, 2002: 4). The problem is that these “opportunities’ are rendered highly disproportionate by the very social perception of the immigrants’ identity.

Newcomers in a given society are often perceived as the classic ‘other’ (Pennix, 2005), one who does not belong in that space and, provided s/he operates changes in his/her behaviour so as to conform to the general practices, s/he will not be recognized as a full member of that society, and accordingly will not be offered the means to equate those already there. Their assigned identity as the ‘other’ may be based on various attributes: immigrant status, physical appearance, that is race, perceived cultural and religious differences, class characteristics, or any other intersection of these (Pennix, 2005). Such representations have an impact not only the interpersonal social dynamics and interaction, but they also reinforce the collective practices of social exclusion, based on the perceived differences between the groups.

It is in these circumstances that ethnic and racialized characteristics become internalized as social disadvantages. In this respect, I am borrowing from the social theory of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, in my emphasis that social relations are of an utmost importance in understanding the process of social integration. While the ethnic and mainstream social networks could be interpreted as social capital, as a means for facilitating integration, it is yet important to acknowledge the power

relations inherent in these social relations, which are at the basis of immigrants' perception of their ethnicity/race as a social disadvantage. Portes defines the 'social capital' as "the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in social networks or broader social structures" (Brettel & Hollifield, 2000:83). But if these social structures, by virtue of the power relations that govern them, impose membership categories and hierarchies on those that are trying to make use of them, then, integration restrictions are implicitly set-up. Immigrants are expected to play a certain social role in order to be accepted. In this process, language and discourse become the tools for creating the subject positions (subjectivities) taken by both the addressor and the addressed, which are generally driven by the 'desire' to subordinate the Other. There are thus created systems of power, to which the individual willingly submits, in order to enter the social mainstream and "to create the appearance of coherence that is required for social participation within modernity" (Tew, 2002:123).

In this context, it is important to document how within public policy (including Multiculturalism) such notions as 'immigrant', 'visible minorities', 'racial minorities', 'citizenship', 'cultural diversity', and even 'justice' are socially constructed and how the social perceptions have been colonized, racialised, ethnicised, and gendered, so as to support the process of 'othering' that legitimizes in its turn the 'normative' Canadian. My analysis of Multiculturalism is framed by the *theory of cultural representation* promoted by Gramsci (1973) and Hall (1996). It is the cultural frameworks themselves that act as social actors, capable not only to reproduce, but also to produce material and political realities. I am also taking on Li's *politics of difference* in territorial and social space (2004) in my emphasis on the representation of 'racialised others' through the articulation of the ideological framework; it is through this practice of cultural representation that the supposed 'insiders' have secured their 'legitimate' social space (be it the national space, the justice space, the

work space, or the multicultural space) and rendered the ‘outsiders’ different from the “imagined community or community of imagination” (Bannerji, 2000:106) promoted by the public discourse.

What I am arguing here is that the state has constructed a social order by means of a symbolic representation. This symbolic representation, making use of the power of language, has been articulated through the public discourse on national identity and multiculturalism and created categories and stereotypes about the ‘others’, implicitly setting up the reference ‘norm’. Through the meaning language gives people about the social world, the cultural framing of these ‘racialized others’ has been internalized to such an extent, that it came not only to reproduce, but also to produce multilayered power relations in all the aspects of Canadian social, economic, and political life. That is why, Banerji insists in her analysis of the multiculturalism ideology, as a tool in branding Canada a culturally diverse country, that “speaking (here) of culture without addressing power relations displaces and trivializes deep contradictions. It is a reductionism that hides the social relations of domination that continually create “difference” as inferior and thus signifies continuing relations of antagonism” (Banerji, 2000:110). Bannerji (2000:87-124) goes on to reveal how the biases inherent in the Multicultural policy mirror Canada’s imperialist past and multilayered power relations, which yet continue to be activated through public discourse, embedded superiority representations, and national regulations: “The construction of visible minorities as a social imaginary and the architecture of ‘nation’ built with a ‘multicultural mosaic’ can only be read together with the engravings of conquests, wars and exclusions” (Bannerji, 2000:107). The main issue resides in the state’s interest to construct immigrants as ‘minority’ or ‘visible’ or ‘racial’, that is to ‘otherise’ them, in order to perpetuate the power relations, to assign them “marginalized” identities and spaces, to place them outside the ‘norm’, in other words to reinforce the “colonial geographies” (Razack, 2002:129).

The cultural representation and construction structure the ideological framework, which in turn enables the self-proclaimed ‘insiders’ to maintain separate symbolic spaces. This self-regulated entitlement to the cultural space is nowadays protected through the discourse on ‘security’ against external ‘threats’, against the ‘uncivilised’. This is not to advocate that violence, in any form, is to be agreed to as a means to resist cultural hegemony, as it is not as a means to ‘civilise’ for that matter. What I want to suggest here is that we are witnessing a new form of the ‘othering’ process, a form validated by the discourse on ‘security’, based on induced perceptions of cultural difference. This is not a new phenomenon by all means.

The process of othering is inherent in Canada’s nation-making project:

“Englishness/Europeanness, that is whiteness, emerges as the hegemonic Canadian identity. (...) This ideological Englishness/whiteness is central to the programme of multiculturalism. It provides the content of Canadian culture, the point of departure for “multiculture”. This same gesture creates “others” with power-organized “differences”, and the material basis of this power lies both below and along the linguistic-semiotic level” (Bannerji, 2000:118). There is created a binary opposition that leads to benchmarking, which is ignorant of the multiple differences within the category of ‘others’: the assumption is that those ‘different’ (be they named black, Aboriginal, visible or racial minorities, immigrants, refugees, newcomers, new Canadians, ethnics, and more recently Arabs or Muslims) deviate from the ‘norm’. As Li put it, this representation silences their voices and rejects them the place in the representational space of the normative and symbolic order (Li, 2004:28). They are categorised at a representational and symbolic level and the terms used to designate them are in fact de-legitimizing social codes that invest them with a lower legal social status. They are assigned “officially constructed identities” (Bannerji, 2000:105), which essentialize the difference to the cultural and physical characteristics; yet, these identities underpin the class power relations and the

cultural hegemony, which are mediated by state through the official policy of Multiculturalism and more recently at the global level through the new immigration and security measures.

I will turn now to casting a critical perspective on the new legislative measures instituted by Canada after September 2001 to ‘harmonise the border control’ within the international climate of ‘fear’, so carefully instilled not necessarily by the events themselves, but by the intense controlled mediatisation managed by the old colonial forces to pursue the cultural and economic hegemony at the global level. This will conclude the thesis of the paper that the terrorist attacks only reinforced the assimilationist and conforming trends and patterns already in practice in Canadian society – in spite of the discursively apparent integrationist nature of the Multicultural policy – while simultaneously legitimising exclusionary practices through the adoption of the ‘security’ discourse. This is gradually transforming from a military strategy into a social ideology, by marking a change in the perception of certain immigrant or refugee categories from contributors to Canadian economic and social landscape to ‘threats’ to national security. When analysing the ‘security’ discourse as a social ideology, I am relying on the resurrection of the “past mentalities seeking to classify refugees and immigrants as ‘preferred’ or ‘non-preferred’ based on factors such as race, religion, or country of origin” (PCERII, 2004). How is that possible in a country where multiculturalism is ranked as a state policy? The global concern for national ‘security’ and collective, better said national ‘rights’ at the expense of individual rights – though specifically stipulated in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – made it possible.

The legislative measures taken by Canada and other countries in the world inclined the balance in favour of collective, better said national rights, most often with infringements of basic human individual rights. This re-orientation of the priorities of the national political agendas in various countries has had an impacted not only the way (im)migrants – especially those ‘categorised’

as having a Middle-Eastern appearance – perceive their social integration, but also, and maybe most importantly, the way the residence population (i.e. nationals) receives them and perceives the ‘right’ way (im)migrants should act so as to become or theoretically be considered full members in the host societies.

Following the terrorist attacks, Canada passed two pieces of legislation aimed at ensuring national ‘security’: the *Anti-Terrorism Act* in October 2001 and the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* in June 2002. Intentionally or not, they equated the terms ‘terrorist’ or ‘threat to national security’ with ‘foreign national’. The association of ‘foreign national’ and ‘terrorist’ (with virtually no clear definition) allows the ‘terrorist threat’ to become “an imported problem encouraging a *security-driven, regulatory mentality* that seeks to prevent and deter *outsiders* from entering Canada” or to place excessive surveillance on those already in Canada, but who fall under the description of ‘Middle-Eastern appearance’ and happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time (PCERII, 2004:8, italics mine). The democratic and legal rights and liberties, pluralism, and respect for human dignity, which are “basic tenets” of Canadian legal system and find explicit affirmation in the Charter, are sacrificed in the name of fighting terrorism (CAIR-CAN & CAF, 2004). I have previously shown though that the values of cultural pluralism have been rendered flawed in practice by the cultural representation in the Multicultural policy that strengthens the inherent power relations. Such measures in the name of security include “police and CSIS visits to places of employment, interviewing neighbours about ‘suspect’ families, interviews when the individuals are more likely to be sleeping, threats of ‘preventative arrest’, attempts to meet in the absence of counsel – even when counsel is specifically requested, inappropriate questioning by CSIS and RCMP officers on religious practice and devotion, repeated questioning by CSIS and RCMP officers upon returning from Hajj or the pilgrimage” (CAIR-CAN & CAF, 2004). All these

measures, as well as other hate and bias incidents targeting Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, and Sikh Canadians following the terrorist attacks have created a climate of fear on the part of these minority communities, simply because they display certain ethno-cultural characteristics that do not conform to the mainstream. “There is a deep concern in the Arab and Muslim communities – reinforced by their collective experience over the past three years – that they are not secure in Canada, that their rights are less worthy of protection than those of other Canadians, that they are special targets of police surveillance, interdictions, and overzealousness. Canadian Muslims and Arabs are targeted because of their ethnicity and religion” (CAIR-CAN & CAF, 2004) (see also the notes at the beginning of the essay on religion as a tool in the politics of difference).

How can ‘reciprocal integration’ be possible in such circumstances? The equity and equality principles theoretically promoted by the Multiculturalism policy, as well as basic individual rights have faded in the face of the racial profiling undergone in the name of national ‘security’. Moreover, immediately after the terrorist attacks, there was a virulent backlash against the minority groups displaying certain ethno-cultural identities – “Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, and Sikh Canadians all once again found themselves on the receiving end of unjust treatment meted out by their neighbours. Arab Canadians, and in at least one puzzling case Aboriginal Canadians, also found themselves victimized by hate and bias” (Biles, 2002:55).

Even though public polls indicate that the number of Canadians that agreed to racial profiling as a security measure rapidly decreased within two months after the attacks, from 50% to 37% (Biles, 2002:58), indicating possible symptomatic discrimination attitudes, the situation of the visible minority groups in Canada continues to be of particular concern, just as it was before the attacks. In June 2004, 7% of Canadians manifested their desire to prevent Muslims, Arabs, Asians, and visible minorities from immigrating (CRIC, June 2004, mentioned in Biles, 2005). Moreover, an even

higher percentage, 18%, agreed that Canada should prohibit people from Islamic countries from immigrating to Canada “to reduce the threat of terrorism” (CRIC, June 2004, mentioned in Biles, 2005). And this is in the circumstances in which 81% of Canadians had agreed that Multiculturalism has positively contributed to the Canadian identity (Jedwab, 2003).

Canadians’ attitudes are contradicting and stand proof for a dissonance between policy, discourse, and public behaviour. Or, if one takes into account the messages in the discourse, exposed earlier on in this paper, then the pieces come together to paint a profoundly cultural hegemonic Canada, harmonized with the global practices of exclusion. More recent public polls indicate that 54% Canadians would rather “safeguard than sacrifice their civil liberties in the fight against terrorism, even if that means accepting a lower level of public security” (CRIC, 2005), which would make the supporters of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms proud. Yet, 57% think that “more visible minorities would fundamentally change Canada” (CRIC, 2005). What kind of an environment for mutual integration could they offer if displaying such attitudes? And one should keep in mind that “the statistics fail to convey a sense of the true harm inflicted upon the individuals and groups that are the target of hate crimes” (Biles et al., 2002). The social and economic disadvantage perceived as a consequence of manifesting the ethno-cultural identities leaves no alternative to the ethnic minorities but to try and conform to the mainstream practices and norms. It seems that acceptance of the inferiority status, of the ‘incivil’ stigma is the only ‘choice’ available.

The hate and bias incidents targeting Arabic people following the 9/11 events have been much more dramatic and overtly racist in Europe. As opposed to Canada, where there is manifested what has been called a ‘common sense’ discrimination under the appearances of mutual respect and a multicultural society, in the Netherlands, the right-wing populist campaign of Pim Fortuyn, his assassination, as well as that of Theo van Gogh seriously challenged the concept of ‘reciprocal

integration' and the social premises for the existence of Multiculturalism. Yet, there had been signs of a re-consideration of the approach to social integration long before the 9/11 events, since early 1990s (Bader, 2005). As a result, the Netherlands is the first country to demand immigrants to take an integration course and 300 hours of Dutch language training at their own expense (BBC, 2002).

Similar approaches to immigrants' integration have been signaled in Britain as well, where the minister responsible for immigration, Home Secretary David Blunkett, is on record as saying that immigrants need to learn how best to accommodate their own culture to life in Britain today (BBC, 2002). In July 2004, Italian newspapers announced the creation of an "Islamic class" in a high school in Milano, but the proposal unleashed virulent discussions and the Ministry of Education rejected the initiative, generally defining it unconstitutional (BBC, 2002). The case shed light on the risks of a strategy of integration via religion, an attempt that was also rejected in France where the hijab was banned in schools.

If the public support for such measures in Europe could be explained by the relatively new immigration phenomenon there, as a mass phenomenon, and by the existence of a pre-established social structure based on the concept of a nation-state, one could see alarming threats to the Multicultural policy and 'reciprocal integration' in Canada, where 38% of the population agreed with the policy recently adopted by the government of France (Jedwab, 2005). As previously mentioned, the cultures of immigrants in Canada too are seen as threatening the prevailing 'symbolic order'; hence, the conforming pressures to become 'more like us'. The Social Cohesion Survey in 2002 revealed that there was almost an equal proportion of Canadians who felt that minority groups should adapt to Canadian norms rather than Canadians accommodate to the cultural diversity. 45% felt that it was a higher priority to encourage minority groups to try to change to be more like most Canadians (Enviroics, 2002, mentioned in Jedwab, 2005). So, there is a complete paradox between

how Multiculturalism is seen a source of strength and pride for Canadian identity, while there are simultaneously figures pointing out to the fact that there is a perception that immigrants should give up their cultural background to become more like the mainstream. The ‘paradox’ can be solved out if one takes the approach suggested by Banerji (2000) and outlined in the first part of the paper. I am corroborating that perspective with the view put forward by Jean-Claude Ricci (*Introduction to Resch, 2001:13*) in this last section of the paper to make clear the main point that ‘national /international security’ is just another legitimated tool for the articulation of the cultural hegemony, tending to replace Multiculturalism in its exclusionary functional practices.

Jean-Claude Ricci considers that nobody should argue about the benefits of the mixture of people and cultures. But, he adds, there are reservations about this process. One of the explanations he provides is *the fear of a foreign invasion* (“La crainte d’une invasion par les étrangers”), the *fear of losing identity*. This fear is experienced on both sides: the immigrants fear for the necessity to give up their cultural traditions, language, practice norms, in order to be recognized as members with the same rights as the majority; the majority group(s) members are worried about their own identity and, recently about the possibility of a ‘terrorist’ attack. This latter dimension furthermore complicated the economic and cultural challenges the integration process had posed until September 2001. It created a climate of fear that had negative consequences on those that suddenly were no longer theoretically and discursively seen as enriching the social fabric of the host society, but as potential ‘threats’ to national security. But it is either for reasons of threat to the cultural and economic identity, or for reasons of threat to the national ‘security’, that the majority group(s) members have always refused – with higher or lower intensity, overtly or subvertly – to create the appropriate conditions for the newcomers to integrate in practical terms, tolerating them, rather than accepting and recognizing them as members of their society. And this is also Canada’s case, which, in spite of

the national discourse portraying the country as an open, inclusive, multicultural society, has most often failed in meeting the commitment to the equal treatment of all of its members, not to mention the racist nature of its immigration policies in the past.

The cultural representation both in the Multicultural policy and in the ‘security’ discourse, in that it defines the new (potential) members as ethnic groups, minorities, immigrants etc, respectively ‘foreign’ nationals, not only reproduces, but also produces, constructs an inferiority status for those defined as such. The social and economic practices then reinforce this minority status and bring about social exclusion. “What multiculturalism has resulted in is another form of division where you have a mere toleration of difference within the context of a social hierarchy based on the core values of the original members of the society” (Duncan, 2005: 13). Rather than an instrument for integration, Multiculturalism has so far proved to be an instrument for branding Canada’s social cohesion and national identity, as it has been fully embraced neither by the official institutions in terms of offering all the society members equitable opportunities for economic and/or justice access, nor by mainstream population in terms of creating the necessary social environment for the newcomers to feel that they are treated equally and without resent. “Members of cultural or ethnic minorities find themselves less than equal members of the society. Instead of a celebration of difference, the actual implementation of Multiculturalism has often produced a near-perfunctory tolerance of difference within a deeply-rooted *inequality* amongst minority groups” (Duncan, 2005: 13). The race against world ‘terrorism’ and the contingent ‘security’ measures only reinforce this aspect. According to the Ethnic Diversity Survey in 2003, one in four visible minorities in Canada felt uncomfortable because of their ethno-cultural characteristics at least some of the time and one in five visible minorities felt they received unfair treatment especially at work or when applying for a job (Statistics Canada, 2003, in Kunz, 2004).

The present paper is far from having dealt with the complex issues posed by the analysis of the cultural setting and the power relations manifested in the global world. By showcasing the situation of Canada, my arguments went to prove that the ideal process of mutual integration, the way it is promoted by the Multiculturalist policy, has always been complicated and rendered conforming in everyday practices by the prevalent power relations, covertly shaped by the policy itself through cultural representation. This is reflective of the social interactions between the mainstream population and those assigned the identity of minority groups. When considering the case of Canada in the larger context after the 9/11 events, it was shown how the reading of the ‘anti-terrorist’ fight through the lens of ‘security’ rationalism, without attention to the more subvert cultural meanings, narrows critical insight into the complex structures of power and hides the vision of cultural hegemony in a global world that seems only to reproduce the old colonial practices.

References:

- Abu-Laban, Y., Gabriel, C. (2002). Selling (out) diversity in an age of globalisation. *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalisation*. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Pp.165-179.
- Bader, V. (2005, Winter). Dutch nightmare? The end of Multiculturalism? *Canadian Diversity*, pp. 9-12.
- Bannerji, H. (2000). On the Dark Side of the Nation. *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Gender*. Canadian Scholars’ Press. Pp. 87-124.
- Brettell, C., James, H. (2000). *Migration Theory. Talking across Disciplines*. New York and London: Routledge.
- BBC. (2002, October). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2290425.stm>.
- Biles, J., Ibrahim, H. (2002, September). Testing “The Canadian Diversity Model”: hate, bias and fear after September 11th. *Canadian Issues*, pp. 54-59.
- Biles, J., Tolley, E., Ibrahim, H. (2005, Winter). Does Canada have a multicultural future? *Canadian Diversity*, pp. 23-29.
- CAIR-CAN, CAF. *Opening Statement. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar*. From <http://www.maherarar.ca>.

- CRIC. (2005). Portraits of Canada. The annual tracking poll conducted by the Centre for Research & Information on Canada. From www.cric.ca
- Donaldson, I. (2004, Winter). Identity, intersections of diversity and the Multiculturalism Program. *Canadian Diversity*, pp. 14-17.
- Dorais, M. (2002). Immigration and integration through a social cohesion perspective. *Horizons*, 4.
- Duncan, H. (2005, Winter). Multiculturalism: still a viable concept for integration? *Canadian Diversity*, pp. 12-15.
- Gramsci, A. Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1973. In Li, Peter S. The Place of Immigrants: Politics of Difference in Territorial and Social Space. *Canadian Diversity / Diversite Canadienne*. 3.2 (2004): 23-28.
- Hall, S. (1996). "New Ethnicities". *Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, pp. 441-449.
- Hutnik, N. (1991). *Ethnic Minority Identity. A Social Psychological Perspective. A Reader*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Jedwab, J. (2003). Diversity popular among Canadians as Federal Government proclaims National Multiculturalism Day. March 2003. Survey of 2,002 Canadians. In Biles, J., Tolley, E., Ibrahim, H. (2005, Winter). Does Canada have a multicultural future? *Canadian Diversity*, pp. 23-29.
- Jedwab, J. (2004, Summer). Multicultural confessions: the new challenges of religion to Canadian public policy on diversity. *Canadian Issues*, pp. 26-30.
- Jedwab, J. (2005, Winter). Neither finding, nor losing our way: the debate over Canadian multiculturalism. *Canadian Diversity*, pp. 95-103.
- Kunz, J.L. (2002, Winter). Labour market integration of immigrants and racial minorities: identities that count. *Canadian Diversity*, pp. 31-34.
- Li, P. S. (1999). *Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada*. Second Edition. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
- Li, P. S. The place of immigrants: politics of difference in territorial and social space. *Canadian Diversity / Diversite canadienne*. 3.2 (2004): 23-28.
- PCERII. (2004). Canada after 9/11: new security measures and "preferred" immigrants. *Working Paper* No. WP09-04.
- Pennix, R. (2005). Integration of migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimension. *Paper* presented at the Metropolis Expert Panel on Social Integration of Immigrants. House of Commons, Ottawa.
- Razack, S. (2002). Gendered violence and spatialised justice: the murder of Pamela George. In Razack, S. ed. *Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society*. Pp. 121-156.
- Resch, Y. (2001). *Definir l'integration? Perspectives nationales et representations symboliques*. Montreal (Quebec), Canada: XYZ editeur.
- Tew, J. (2002). "Stepping Out: (De)constructing Identities". In *Social Theory, Power and Practice*. 121-151.
- Weinfeld, M. (2005). "A Preliminary Stock-Taking on Immigration Research in Canada". *Metropolis Project*.